EUobserver opinion: Before the boat: Understanding the migrant journey

The migration plan that was unveiled by the European Commissioner on 26 May, which featured the resettlement of 40,000 refugees to countries in Europe, is already facing hefty opposition from some of the members states who will be expected to carry the largest burden - particularly Germany and France.

In response, the Commissioner said that such a debate was to be expected, hoping that it will mainly serve as constructive criticism for the discussion of the plan among European Interior Ministers scheduled for 15-16 June.

While the migration debate is heating up, the central character in the drama that is currently unfolding in the Mediterranean - the migrant - is presented consistently as a passive actor.

EU and member state policies in relation to smuggling via the Mediterranean are often weak on insights into migrant perspectives, decisions and relationships with smugglers.

A policy chosen without considering the behaviour of its target is likely to fail. In this case, it may even amplify the problem.

Who are the migrating people?

To start with, let’s question the generalisations that people migrating irregularly are either a homogenous bloc of helpless indigents, or a faceless group of feckless illegals.

Instead, let’s acknowledge that they are individual adults and children from a variety of communities in a variety of countries, who are making decisions with imperfect information and with varying degrees of vulnerability.

Here’s one example: for all the devastation in Syria, the majority of its population is still there and most refugees from Syria are in neighbouring countries.

Even if all the others got on boats to Europe - which they won’t - then a policy aiming to reduce this flow shouldn’t address “Syrians”. It should address a specific kind of Syrian.

It would engage with the minority of Syrians thinking about taking the trip, deciding to do so, then departing. To know who they are, we’ll need to work with them.

A key concern relates to expanding resettlement from third countries. If one purpose of resettlement is to reduce demand for smuggler services, then the choice of who to resettle is absolutely critical.

Not everyone is a potential customer for a smuggler.

For example, Eritreans in Sudan vary a lot in their desire and capacity to reach Europe. Some are much more interested in the US. Some want to return to Eritrea. Some are interested in going to Europe but would not take a boat. Some have no desire to reach Europe, while others have family in Europe encouraging them to come irregularly.

With people holding such different interests, the impacts of an invitation to resettlement will vary tremendously.

In some cases, for example if it establishes new connections from Europe to communities and families in source and transit countries, it may increase demand for irregular migration.

To know who to resettle, we’ll need to understand them.

Counter smuggling measures

Another concern is to prepare for the impact of counter-smuggling measures on migrants and the authorities in places like Libya and Turkey.

The relationship between migrant and smuggler varies from highly coercive to five-star service. The variation comes both from the context and from the migrants’ capacities.

For example, it seems that many Syrians this year have been able to revert to using routes through Turkey and Greece, perhaps as a response to drownings in the Mediterranean.

By contrast, most Eritreans are still moving through Libya.

Similarly, the smuggling market in Libya tends to be brutal towards Eritreans but somewhat kinder towards those from West Africa.

More vigorous counter-smuggling ambitions will therefore provoke different enforcement, diplomatic and humanitarian consequences for different places and people.

Relationships between migrants, smugglers and political patrons will be the decisive influence, but are not well understood.

One size will not fit all

Strategies aimed at an undifferentiated mass are unlikely to work and may make things worse.

In domestic policy, nobody would design a poverty reduction programme without differentiating between rich and poor, or anticipating how these people would respond.

Any communications campaign on ‘the risks of irregular migration’ will need to be just as sensitive to different sub-groups as a campaign on the risks of smoking.

A strategy that does not build on an understanding of irregular migrants as individuals will be in the hands of fortune. At worst, it may force more people into smugglers’ clutches.

Jacob Townsend and Christel Oomen work for Farsight, a social enterprise specialising in migration, conflict and justice. They co-authored the Migration Policy Institute's report 'Before the Boat: Understanding the Migrant Journey'