Overzicht van diplomatieke betrekkingen tussen de EU en Noord-Korea (en)
-FACTSHEET-
Brussels, 10 April 2013
The EU and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Overview of EU-DPRK relations
The EU has three key interests regarding DPRK: regional peace and stability; denuclearisation / non-proliferation and human rights. The EU's policy is balanced between a firm and principled stance on non-proliferation (defending global non-proliferation/the Non-proliferation Treaty is a key EU objective) and advancing human rights
The domestic situation in DPRK remains grim
The UN estimates that some 16 million people there suffer from malnutrition or food insecurity. Access to healthcare and sanitation is poor in rural areas, while infant mortality is rising. Chronic and acute malnutrition represent an obstacle to growth and productivity. With widespread deforestation and land erosion, agricultural projects have not reduced food shortages; cereals output increased by 10% in 2012 but is expected to decline again in 2013 due to a shortage of winter and spring seeds. Energy is also in short supply, as are raw materials and fertilisers
Economic growth is subdued at an average of 0.4% of GDP. DPRK's main trading partners are China and South Korea
The Gaesong Industrial Complex is a bilateral project allowing South Korean companies to employ North Korean workers, which generate revenues of approximately € 65 million a year. Operation of the Kaesong Industrial Complex was interrupted on 9 April as North Korean workers were not sent to work
In its policy approach to DPRK, the EU uses various instruments at its disposal, with a general approach being that of critical engagement1 : regular political dialogue, development assistance programmes (roughly €6 million a year under European Commission food security programmes as well as a small number of other operations) on one hand, and diplomatic pressure and sanctions on the other
In response to three nuclear tests in recent years, the UN has adopted several resolutions, condemning the tests and introducing restrictive measures while calling on DPRK to respect its international obligations. Tensions began escalating again at the end of 2012: first with a "satellite" launch on 12 December using ballistic missile technology; followed by a third nuclear test on 12 February 2013 and further provocative acts and statements (announced intention to reopen the
There is no EU Delegation in Pyongyang but the EU is represented, on a six-months rotating basis, by one of the seven EU Member States present there (currently Sweden)
Yongbyon nuclear facility, deployment of two mid-range missiles on the east coast, threats of preemptive nuclear strikes against the South and the U.S. and nullification of the Korean war armistice)
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission Catherine Ashton i has reacted to the developments with several statements and interventions (see statements and remarks), as has the Foreign Affairs Council (see conclusions)
Given DPRK actions, the EU is closely consulting its key partners in the region and strongly supports UNSC Resolution 2094, including restrictive measures. The EU is working on implementing these measures in addition to its own restrictive measures. The EU also supports the resumption of the Six Party Talks process
In the context of its policy of critical engagement with the DPRK, the EU remains open to political dialogue with the DPRK, timing being contingent upon political and security circumstances
Human Rights
The human rights situation remains an issue of great concern. In the light of the gravity and chronic nature of the violations in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the persistent refusal of its authorities to co-operate with the UN Special Rapporteur, the EU, together with Japan, presented a resolution concerning the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the grave and persistent violations of human rights in the DPRK to the UN Human Rights Council. The resolution was adopted by consent on 21 March 2013 in Geneva in the Human Rights Council
Reliable information about the humanitarian situation remains scarce. There are cogent reports of extensive use of political prison camps, poor prison conditions and prisoners being subjected to forced labour, torture and corporal punishment. Some 150,000 to 200,000 people are estimated to be imprisoned in six camps for alleged political crimes
DPRK imposes severe restrictions on the rights to freedoms of expression and assembly uses various, and extensive, social control mechanisms to exercise almost total control over society. Surveillance is widespread and overt. There is virtually no official access to external information; foreign media and the internet are forbidden to almost all DPRK citizens and the still relatively new mobile phone network is assumed to be closely monitored. Individuals possessing contraband materials face harsh punishment
International monitoring bodies - notably the UN Special Rapporteur for human rights in DPRK -have reported abuses including: the widespread use of torture and labour camps against political prisoners and DPRK citizens who have attempted to flee the country; extensive use of the death penalty; pervasive and severe restrictions on freedoms of thought, expression, assembly and religion as well as the complete exclusion of citizens from participation in the conduct of public affairs. Violations of social and economic rights are reflected in severe malnutrition and widespread health problems
Sanctions
EU restrictive measures against DPRK were introduced to implement UNSC Resolutions (UNSCR 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009) and 2087 (2013) all following DPRK nuclear tests) and include further additional EU autonomous measures. The measures are targeted at the nuclear and ballistic missile programmes of the DPRK. Measures include prohibitions on the export and import of arms and goods and technology which could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missiles-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes. Additional measures - including in the trade, transport and financial sectors - have also been taken, both by the UN and autonomously by the EU
The EU last strengthened its measures on 18 February 2013, giving effect to the measures of UN Security Council resolution 2087. The Council also agreed EU additional autonomous measures, including in particular a ban on the export and import of certain goods relevant the DPRK's ballistic missiles-sector and certain additional measures in the financial and trade sectors. 26 persons and 33 entities are currently subject to EU sanctions (partly UN and partly autonomous designations)
UN Security Council resolution 2094 (2013) imposes a number of robust new measures, in particular in the financial sector, and also widens the scope of a number of already existing measures. The EU will transpose these measures as soon as possible. The EU is now discussing a possible additional number of EU autonomous measures beyond the robust UN package
ANNEX
EU restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) -as in force on 8 April 2013 and pending the adoption of EU legal acts implementing UNSCR 2094 (2013)
Export and import ban on arms and related materiel of all types. This includes a prohibition on related technical assistance and financing
Export and import ban on goods which could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes, such as dual-use goods, nuclear materials and facilities, certain chemicals, electronics, certain software. This includes a prohibition on related technical assistance and financing
Export and import ban on key components for ballistic missiles, in particular aluminium in several forms
No provision of public financial support for trade with the DPRK, including export credits,
guarantees or insurance, where this could support the DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic
missiles-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes
- Ban on new commitments for grants, financial assistance and concessional loans to the
DPRK
Prohibition to trade DPRK public or public-guaranteed bonds issued after 19 February 2013 to or from DPRK public bodies. No brokering or issuing services for such bonds are allowed
Prohibition for DPRK financial institutions to open new branches or subsidiaries in the EU. EU banks are prohibited from opening offices or subsidiaries in Syria
Ban on supplying banknotes and coinage to the central bank of DPRK
Ban on exports of luxury goods to the DPRK, such as jewellery, high-end wines, caviar, truffles and luxury vehicles
No trade in precious metals and diamonds with North Korean public bodies, including gold, silver, platinum and diamonds
Travel bans on persons considered responsible for DPRK's nuclear programme or providing financial support for it. This admission ban currently applies to 26 persons: nine of them have been designated by the UN, the others are autonomous EU designations
Asset freeze on the same persons as well as on entities associated with the DPRK's nuclear programme. This concerns 33 entities in total, of which 17 have been designated by the UN, the others are autonomous EU designations
Enhanced monitoring of activities of financial institutions within the jurisdiction of member states in relation to their activities with regard to North Korean banks, be they inside or outside the EU, to avoid such activities contributing to the DPRK's nuclear programme. This includes the monitoring of account activity, enforcing the completion of all information fields of payment instructions, and maintaining all records of transactions for 5 years
Inspection of cargo to and from the DPRK in member states seaports and airports, if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo contains items that are subject to sanctions. Aircraft and vessels transporting cargo to and from the DPRK must also provide additional pre-arrival or pre-departure information for all goods brought into or out of the EU
Ban on provision of bunkering or ship supply services to DPRK vessels if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo contains banned items
No specialised teaching or training of DPRK nationals in disciplines that could contribute to DPRK's nuclear programme