Regime Oekraïne erg zelfverzekerd (en)
Ukraine’s regime appears too confident about its moves to secure power. During the past year and half, the government has met little domestic or international resistance to its authoritarian backlash on democracy.
The unconstitutional establishment of a parliamentary coalition led by President Viktor Yanukovych's Party of the Regions in March 2010 and the reintroduction of a presidential republic in Ukraine by a single decision of the Constitutional Court in October 2010 were hardly criticised by the EU. While the Ukrainian political regime has been increasing the speed and the scope of politically-motivated repressions against former members of ex-PM Yulia Tymoshenko’s government, Europe’s reaction has been moderate at best, that is, until the ex prime minister herself was imprisoned.
The EU and US’s united reaction, followed by Russia, condemning Tymoshenko's arrest, as well as "the group therapy" Yanukovych was submitted to during his trip to Warsaw for the Eastern Partnership summit at the end of September have sent a sobering signal to Ukraine.
The Ukrainian regime had hoped that Europe would swallow Tymoshenko’s arrest, like it did many other times, prioritising commercial interests such as free trade and energy relations over democratic values.
But it was not so. From Brussels to Berlin to Warsaw and elsewhere in Europe, the message has been that the Association Agreement, which includes a deep trade area, European aid to Ukraine, vital for the modernisation of its gas transit system and hand-shaking with European leaders will all be over if the leader of the opposition stays in jail.
Tymoshenko’s seven-year prison sentence and almost €140 million in damages implies that Yanukovych did not believe the EU's message. If it is indeed so, the EU has just received a major slap in the face: European leaders' talk with Yanukovych was a waste of time and the EU's leverage in Ukraine is close to zero.
Diplomatic isolation
For Ukraine, the sentence implies that Yanukovych, willingly or not, is leading his country into diplomatic isolation, which will make it more vulnerable to Russia. And this is exactly what the Ukrainian president wishes to avoid, especially when his government is trying to negotiate cheaper gas prices with Moscow.
Despite all his fears of Tymoshenko's power to lead the people to the streets and eventually threaten the ruling party in the 2012 parliamentary elections, it seems rather unlikely that Yanukovych is ready to assume all the damage that Tymoshenko's imprisonment is about to bring.
How the President of Ukraine is going to get out of the trouble he led himself into remains to be seen. The EU's first reactions sent the strong message that current relations, including the Association Agreement (and Yanukovych's expected visit to Brussels next week to finalise it) are to be revoked if the sentence is not revisited. Yanukovych has already softened EU criticism by saying that the verdict is not final.
Perhaps Yanukovych did believe the EU's last warning and the court's decision is part of his team's 'strategy' for a way out. In their view, a not guilty verdict for Tymoshenko would have damaged Yanukovych personally, who would have seemed to be bowing to Brussels’ pressure. Similarly, an acquittal would have meant that the whole trial was a sham and would only serve to improve Tymoshenko's image ahead of next year's parliamentary elections.
Battle for democracy continues
Inside Ukraine, there is already a debate on possible ways out for Yanukovych and his team. Possible options are to revoke the sentence in an appeals court or introduce amendments to the Criminal Code, revising the article under which Tymoshenko has been accused.
If this happens, Yanukovych's image may improve in the eyes of the Europeans, but the battle for Ukraine's democracy will continue. Tymoshenko might be freed, but this will not imply that the opposition will be able to compete in free and fair elections in 2012.
In fact, the Security Service of Ukraine has already opened a new made-up case against Tymoshenko. Also, the ruling coalition is preparing for an electoral reform, which intends to change the system from a proportional one - introduced during the 2004 Orange Revolution political reform - to a mix of proportional and majority vote that will allow for an extensive use of administrative resources and jiggling the parliamentary majority by buying out the deputies' votes. This will help to cement Yanukovych's power after 2012 and Ukraine will continue to slide down into a pre-revolution-era-type rule.
It is key for Europe to think beyond Tymosheko and short-term crisis management. The EU has to strike a proper balance between increasing the links with Ukraine through free trade and a visa free regime, and applying punitive measures to counter the government’s increasingly authoritarian behaviour.
As things are, if the EU signs the Association Agreement with Yanukovych, it would be showing weakness and send the wrong message to Kyiv and other capitals in Europe's East. Even if Tymoshenko is released, the EU should not rest on its laurels. Instead, it is necessary to double its attention to Ukraine on the eve of the election year and devise a mid to long-term strategy fully to support political pluralism and civil society actors in the country.