Toespraak Hongaarse minister van Buitenlandse Zaken over Noord-Afrika en oostelijke buurlanden EU (en)

Rethinking the European Neighbourhood Policy:

responding to the new challenges in the South, coming up to the

growing expectations from the East

Speech of Zsolt Németh i, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs at the COFACC meeting

Budapest, 2011. május 6.

I.

A general assessment of the developments in the Southern Mediterranean and their consequences for the European Neighbourhood Policy

Policy makers and analists alike are unanimous to single out the „Arab spring , a chain of events altering the outlook in North Africa and the Middle East, as the most challenging and potentially the most promising trend currently u nfolding in the vicinity of the European Union:

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  The outburst of deep social and political discontent in a row of countries in the Southern Mediterranean generates deep and far-reaching structural changes in the „Arab world , the geostrategic consequences of which can be compared only to the rise of Arab nationalism in the nineteen fifties and to the rise of political Islam starting from the late seventies.

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  Seen from the geographic and the strategic perspective of Europe, the current events in the South constitute a challenge to the European Union like no other major international trend since the end of the cold war, 89-90. Based on geographic vicinity as well as on interwoven bonds of history, economy, even demography, the European Union is potentially the most affected international actor by the sway of historic events in North Africa and the Middle East.

The efficacy of the European reaction to these developm ents will have a strong and lasting impact on the international credibility of the EU :

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  If the European Union has the necessary will and deter mination to become a genuine geopolitical player, commensurate with its economic potential, it cannot shy away from its responsibilities to respond to the rising ch allenges and growing expectations in its i mmediate neighbourhood, Southern and Eastern alike.

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  Europe is expected to do definitely more than merely defending itself from the upsetting consequences of the „turmoil” in the South.

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  The „Arab street has questioned the viability of an until recently widely accepted Western (including European) approach which had, by assuming the geopolitical vu lnerability of the region, put the requirement of maintaining stability above all other considerations, including progress towards the prevalence of basic democratic values. This is a serious criticism of the ENP!

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  The European Union should be forthright in furthering in its Southern neighbourhood the very values upon which the European construction itself is based, without seeking (or imposing) solutions moulded mechanically upon European or „Western” patterns. At the same ti me, building democratic institutions cannot be separated from a truly inclusive economic development that is able to offer hope for broader segments of the population of our Southern neighbours.

This complex equation (the parallel tasks of helping democratization and boosting economic development in the South, while maintaining the rhytm of the ambitious program of approximating our Eastern neighbours towards the European Union) has clearly changed the general context and the strategic stakes of the European Neighbourhood Policy. This double challenge has to be matched by persi stent acti on and intelli ge nt po li c ies:

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  Rethinking the scope of the policy pursued by the EU in its Southern neighbourhood, as well as mobilizing the resources allocated to this end, could have an effect on the overall conditions of the European Neighbourhood Policy and, consequently, on the level of ambition of the Eastern dimension of ENP, known as Eastern Partnership. It is unclear if these are positive or negative effects.

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  The joint communication issued by the European Commission and the European External Action Service on 3 March 2011 under the title „A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean” stresses that the vocation of the Union is to promote both democracy and stability in the region.

The communication sets well balanced priorities by focussing on democratic transformation, support to civil society as well as on sustainable and inclusive economic development.

We must take note of certain nuances in the positions of the member states. Those close to the Southern shores of the Mediterranean are understandably more anxious about the possible political and security risks and are eager to promote a generous transfer of EU funds towards the South. Member states lying in a distance put more emphasis on boosting economic ties and say that the policy of the EU towards its Southern neighbourhood should stress the principle of conditionality and merit-based differenciation tied to concrete progress in political and economic reforms to be carried out in each country. Opinions inside the EU may differ as to the possible impact that the otherwise justified focus on the Southern Mediterranean might have on the delicate balance between the Southern and Eastern dimensions of ENP.

In spite of the aforementioned nuances, consensus is gaining ground in the European Union according to which current developments in the South give enhanced emphasis, strategic depth and utmost urgency to the review of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The much waited for communication of the European Commission on the ENP review is expected to come out shortly, though with some weeks’ delay.

This communication is not supposed to be the final step of the ENP review. With due respect to the initiative taken by the European Commission and the European External Action Service, meaningful political contribition must come from the member states, in true spirit of the Lisbon Treaty. The recommendations of the communication need to be thoroughly discussed in the Council (appropriate working groups, COREPER, the Foreign Affairs Council). The final political conclusions have to be drawn by the European Council, duly anchored in the preparation of the financial framework of the EU for 2014-2020. The modified date for the Eastern Partnership summit (to be held late September under the Polish EU presidency, co-hosted by Poland and Hungary) gives more time for preparation in the light of results of the ENP review.

II.

The Hungarian view on the balance of the European Neighbourhood Policy and on the relationship between the Eastern Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean

Hungary is conscious of the historic importance of the actual events in the South Mediterranean:

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  We are aware of the possible influence these developments might have on the security and stability of the EU itself.

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  We do acknowledge the unavoidable responsibility of the European Union to foster trends towards economic prosperity, social modernization and political de mocratization.

At the same time, helping democratic transition and maintaining stability in the South, can not diminish the comm itm ent of the E U to the East:

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  Neither the historic developments in the South, nor the understandable anxiousness about the consequences they might entail for Europe should overshadow ENP’s Eastern dimension.

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  Eclipsing Eastern Partnership would undermine the credibility and the prestige of the European Union in the eyes of those Eastern European countries which have been encouraged to take the path of approximation to the EU through consistent political and economic reforms. Some of these partners have managed to reach considerable results by showing sustai ned engagement and they definitely need further stimulus.

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  The target territory of EaP has a relevance of its own, in the direct vicinity of the EU.

The geopolitical importance of the “common neighbourhood” lying between the enlarged Union and a re-emerging Russia as well as the Southern Caucasus, possessing alternative sources of energy supply to the European market, constitute a strategic value for the EU. Reducing our level of interest and attention vis-Q-vis the Eastern neighbourhood might entail security risks for the European Union.

Hungary feels, because of its geographic location and current history, a deep empathy towards the Eastern neighbourhood of the European Union. Nevertheless, we remain firmly engaged in maintaining an equilibrium within the European Neigh bou rh ood Pol icy :

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  It is imperative to break away from past practices and to overcome the temptation fragmenting ENP, since competing policy priorities pointing in opposite geographical directions neutralize each other.

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  Neither the Eastern, nor the Southern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy and, consequently, neither the Eastern Partnership, nor the Union for the Mediterranean, can be strengthened to the detriment of the other.

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  We propose to analyse trends in the Mediterranean and to work out a corresponding European strategy, not only within the concrete context of ENP’s Southern dimension, but also by elevating our common thinking to the overall level of the European Neighbourhood Policy.

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  We firmly believe that ENP is a policy of the EU as a whole and its overall framework must be preserved.

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  Lessons drawn from the current events in the South prove that the guiding principles upon which the European Neighbourhood Policy is based must remain firm in both geographic dimensions.

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  Value-based neighbourhood strategies, such as building democratic institutions, strengthening civil society, introducing benchmarks to measure progress in the implementation of political and economic reforms to support partner countries, Southern and Eastern alike, are to become general characteristics of ENP (the „Matrix” method).

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  Commitment to the coherence of the European Neighbourhood Policy does not exclude differentiation inside ENP. Just to the contrary; instead of ready-made patterns and solutions, the EU is supposed to come out with offers tailored to the needs and conditions of each region, even each country.

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  The principle of differentiation has to be based on each country’s performance. EU funds are supposed to underpin concrete reforms and should be allocated accordingly, instead of pre-established quotas and inflexible ratios resulting from intense lobbying between the European institutions and the member states.

We are obviously aware of the fact that neighbourhood policy and enlargement constitute two different policies of the European Union:

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  We should see to it last, that events in the South divert attention and energy from the process of EU e nlarge me nt i n the Wester n Balkans.

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  Trends in the Southern neighbourhood might inevitably boost the regional weight and influence of Turkey, having possible consequences for the process of Turkish EU integrati on.

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  A profound reassessment of the strategic context of the ENP confirms our conviction, well rooted in the relevant Treaty provisions, that, depending on the reform drive of our European neighbours and the subsequent changes in the intensity and quality of their relations with the EU, the process of enlarging the European Union to the East remains historically to be an open-ended one.
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  ENP review should have a positive wording on this matter.