Vrijheid van meningsuiting in Frankrijk: Mensenrechtenhof spreekt veroordeelde Jehova's getuige vrij van smaad jegens gezinsbond (en)

The European Court of Human Rights has today notified in writing its Chamber judgment [1] in the case of Paturel v. France (application no. 54968/00).

The Court held unanimously that there had been

• - 

  a violation of Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The Court held that the finding of a violation constituted in itself sufficient just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage suffered by the applicant. Under Article 41 (just satisfaction) of the Convention, it awarded him 6,900 euros (EUR) for pecuniary damage and EUR 7,820.29 for costs and expenses. (The judgment is available only in French.)

• 1. 

  Principal facts

The applicant, Christian Paturel, is a French national who was born in 1947 and lives in Croth.

In February 1996 the applicant brought out a book entitled "Sectes, Religions et Libertés Publiques" (`Sects, Religions and Public Freedoms'), which was published at the author's expense by the company "La pensée universelle". The book attacked malpractice by private anti-sect movements which were in receipt of public funding, and was particularly critical of the Union nationale des associations de défense de la famille et de l'individu ("the UNADFI", the `National Union of Associations for the Protection of the Family and the Individual'), an association which focused on the activities of sects.

The UNADFI lodged a complaint against the applicant and his publisher for defamation. In a judgment of 25 March 1997, Paris Criminal Court found the applicant and the company's publishing director guilty of defamation. It imposed fines of 20,000 and 10,000 French francs (FRF) respectively (equivalent to EUR 3,048 and EUR 1,524) and instructed them to pay FRF 1 to the UNADFI as damages and to have the judgment published in two newspapers. This judgment was upheld by Paris Court of Appeal, which also instructed the defendants to pay EUR 15,000 to the UNADFI for the expenses incurred by it.

Both at first instance and on appeal, the courts found that, whilst the denunciation of possible excesses in the fight against sectarian movements was a legitimate aim, the requirements of thoroughness in the investigation and prudent use of language had not been met and that, in addition, the applicant had displayed personal animosity towards the UNADFI.

In a judgment of 5 October 1999 the Court of Cassation dismissed an appeal on points of law submitted by the applicant.

• 2. 

  Procedure and composition of the Court

The application was lodged with the European Court of Human Rights on 6 December 1999 and declared partly admissible on 7 October 2004.

Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows:

Christos Rozakis (Greek), President,

Loukis Loucaides (Cypriot),

Jean-Paul Costa (French),

Françoise Tulkens (Belgian),

Elisabeth Steiner (Austrian),

Khanlar Hajiyev (Azerbaijani),

Dean Spielmann (Luxemburger), judges,

and also Soren Nielsen, Section Registrar.

• 3. 

  Summary of the judgment [2]

Complaint

The applicant alleged that his criminal conviction had entailed breaches of Articles 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion) and 10 of the Convention.

Decision of the Court

The Court decided to examine the applicant's complaints solely under Article 10. The question before it was to determine whether the interference in the applicant's right to freedom of expression was necessary in a democratic society.

The trial courts had criticised the applicant for failing to substantiate the truth of his statements. The Court found that, contrary to the view of the French courts, the disputed statements had reflected a comment on matters of public interest and were to be regarded as value judgments rather than statements of fact. Having reiterated that value judgments were not susceptible of proof, the Court noted that the numerous documents submitted by the applicant constituted a sufficient factual basis.

The French courts had been particularly critical of the applicant for showing a lack of caution and restraint in his choice of language; the Criminal Court had held that he had "exceeded the permitted limits in the context of this debate, by using particularly violent and intemperate expressions about the civil party, with a total absence of caution and restraint in his language". The Court noted, among other things, that certain of the disputed passages certainly had a negative connotation. However, in spite of a certain hostility in some of the impugned extracts and the fact that certain statements could be described as harsh, the book's central issue concerned the methods used to combat organisations described as "sects". It had to be acknowledged that the question of "sects" or "sectarian movements" was widely debated in European societies. The issue was clearly a matter of public interest and any interference must therefore be narrowly interpreted.

As well as referring to a lack of thoroughness in the investigation and insufficient caution in the language used, the French courts had also mentioned the applicant's personal animosity towards the UNADFI. In that connection, the Court noted that, irrespective of the interpretation of the disputed passages in the applicant's book, the fact that the latter was a Jehovah's Witness had been referred to by the trial courts in describing this animosity. The Criminal Court had specifically stated that his membership of the Jehovah's Witnesses organisation strengthened the applicant's personal animosity towards the UNADFI, the latter having included the Jehovah's Witnesses in its list of sects. For its part, the Court of Appeal had held that the disputed passages were "particularly intemperate" in that they ascribed to the UNADFI "the shortcomings of sects themselves".

However, such considerations, which targeted the Jehovah's Witnesses and the applicant as a member of that organisation, could not in themselves be regarded as relevant and sufficient grounds for the applicant's conviction. In addition, the Court pointed out that associations laid themselves open to scrutiny when they entered the arena of public debate and that, since they were active in the public domain, they ought to show a higher degree of tolerance to criticism of their aims by opponents and to the means employed in that debate.

As to the sentence imposed on the applicant, the Court found that, while the damages had been nominal, the fine, although relatively modest, when taken together with the cost of publishing a statement in two newspapers and the costs awarded to the UNADFI, did not seem justified in view of the circumstances.

Accordingly, the Court held that there had been a violation of Article 10.

Judge Costa expressed a concurring opinion, joined by Judge Spielmann. The text of this opinion is annexed to the judgment.

***

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The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg by the Council of Europe Member States in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. Since 1 November 1998 it has sat as a full-time Court composed of an equal number of judges to that of the States party to the Convention. The Court examines the admissibility and merits of applications submitted to it. It sits in Chambers of 7 judges or, in exceptional cases, as a Grand Chamber of 17 judges. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe supervises the execution of the Court's judgments.

[1] Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17 member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer.

[2] This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.