Italië veroordeeld door Mensenrechtenhof wegens smaad door parlementslid (en)

The European Court of Human Rights has today notified in writing its Chamber judgment [1] in the case of Ielo v. Italy (application no. 23053/02).

The Court held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 (access to court) of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Under Article 41 of the Convention (just satisfaction), the Court awarded the applicant 8,000 euros (EUR) for non-pecuniary damage and EUR 5,824.81 for costs and expenses. (The judgment is available only in French.)

• 1. 

  Principal facts

The applicant, Paolo Ielo, is an Italian national who was born in 1961 and lives in Milan (Italy). Since 1993 he has been a member of the Milan Public Prosecutor's Office.

In 1994, while being interviewed by the High Council of the Judiciary, the applicant commented on the working methods of a Mrs Parenti, another member of the Public Prosecutor's Office.

Mrs Parenti, having subsequently become a member of the Italian Parliament and chairwoman of the parliamentary committee responsible for investigating the mafia, made statements to the Italian press agency AGI criticising the applicant's decision to recommend discontinuing proceedings in a criminal investigation concerning the financing of the Communist Party. On 7 May 1995 the Italian daily newspaper "La Repubblica" published comments in which Mrs Parenti explained that the applicant's decision had been due "to his youth rather than his bad faith" and "to his inexperience".

The applicant lodged a complaint alleging defamation and joined the proceedings against Mrs Parenti as a civil party. Mrs Parenti was committed for trial before Rome District Court.

On 22 October 1997 the Chamber of Deputies declared that Mrs Parenti's comments were covered by the immunity provided for in Article 68 § 1 of the Constitution. However, the Rome District Court suspended the proceedings and asked the Constitutional Court to settle a conflict between different branches of State power. It argued that no connection could be detected between the offence Mrs Parenti stood accused of and the exercise of her parliamentary duties.

In a judgment of 4 November 1999 the Constitutional Court rejected Rome District Court's arguments, stating that it was within the rights of the Chamber of Deputies to declare that the offending comments were covered by parliamentary immunity. It considered that Mrs Parenti's remarks were critical of the way the judiciary had made use of its investigative power, that they had been made in the context of a public debate and in response to criticisms that had been made of Mrs Parenti herself in her capacity of chairwoman of the parliamentary committee responsible for investigating the mafia, and that they therefore came within the definition of exercise of her parliamentary duties.

In the light of the Constitutional Court's judgment, Rome District Court acquitted Mrs Parenti on 11 April 2000 on the ground that the act she was accused of did not constitute an offence.

• 2. 

  Procedure and composition of the Court

The application was lodged with the European Court of Human Rights on 6 June 2002 and declared partly admissible on 15 March 2005.

Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows:

Nicolas Bratza (British), President,

Josep Casadevall (Andorran),

Giovanni Bonello (Maltese),

Rait Maruste (Estonian),

Vladimiro Zagrebelsky (Italian),

Stanislav Pavlovschi (Moldovan),

Javier Borrego Borrego (Spanish), judges,

and also Michael O'Boyle, Section Registrar.

• 3. 

  Summary of the judgment [2]

Complaint

The applicant submitted that the recognition of Mrs Parenti's parliamentary immunity had infringed his right of access to a court.

Decision of the Court

The Court observed that the fact that Mrs Parenti's remarks were judged to have been covered by the parliamentary immunity - provided for in Article 68 § 1 of the Constitution - had led to the discontinuation of the proceedings against her. The applicant had thus been deprived of the possibility of obtaining any kind of reparation for his alleged prejudice. That being so, the Court considered that the applicant had suffered interference with his right of access to a court.

The Court noted that the granting of parliamentary immunity was a long-established practice intended to enable the representatives of the people to express themselves freely and to prevent partisan prosecutions interfering with the workings of parliament. The Court accordingly considered that the interference in question, which was provided for in Article 68 § 1 of the Constitution, pursued legitimate aims, namely protection of free parliamentary debate and maintenance of separation between the legislative and judiciary powers.

As to whether the interference had been proportionate, the Court noted that the remarks which had given rise to the proceedings had not been linked to the exercise of parliamentary duties in the strict sense, but seemed to have been made in the context of a quarrel between individuals. Mrs Parenti herself had told Rome District Court that her comments had been intended as a reply to the criticisms the applicant had made of her. But the denial of access to a court could not be justified on the sole ground that the quarrel might have been of a political nature or linked to a political activity. In the Court's opinion, the absence of a clear link with a particular parliamentary activity required a narrow interpretation of the concept of proportionality between the aim pursued and the means employed. This was particularly true where the restrictions on the right of access derived from a motion passed by a political organ. Any different finding would amount to restricting individuals' access to a court in a manner incompatible with Article 6 § 1 whenever the offending remarks had been made by a member of parliament.

That being so, the Court considered that the acquittal of Mrs Parenti had upset the fair balance to be maintained between the requirements of the general interest of the community and protection of the fundamental rights of the individual. The Court also attached importance to the fact that after the decision by the Chamber of Deputies and the judgment of the Constitutional Court the applicant had had no other reasonable remedies whereby he could protect his rights under the Convention effectively. Consequently, the Court held that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1.

***

The Court's judgments are accessible on its Internet site (http://www.echr.coe.int).

Registry of the European Court of Human Rights

F - 67075 Strasbourg Cedex

Press contacts: Roderick Liddell (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 24 92)

Emma Hellyer (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 90 21 42 15)

Stéphanie Klein (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 21 54)

Beverley Jacobs (telephone: +00 33 (0)3 90 21 54 21)

Fax: +00 33 (0)3 88 41 27 91

The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg by the Council of Europe Member States in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. Since 1 November 1998 it has sat as a full-time Court composed of an equal number of judges to that of the States party to the Convention. The Court examines the admissibility and merits of applications submitted to it. It sits in Chambers of 7 judges or, in exceptional cases, as a Grand Chamber of 17 judges. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe supervises the execution of the Court's judgments. More detailed information about the Court and its activities can be found on its Internet site.

[1] Under Article 43 of the European Convention on Human Rights, within three months from the date of a Chamber judgment, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 17 member Grand Chamber of the Court. In that event, a panel of five judges considers whether the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its protocols, or a serious issue of general importance, in which case the Grand Chamber will deliver a final judgment. If no such question or issue arises, the panel will reject the request, at which point the judgment becomes final. Otherwise Chamber judgments become final on the expiry of the three-month period or earlier if the parties declare that they do not intend to make a request to refer.

[2] This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.