Europarlementariër Andrew Duff bekijkt zes mogelijke scenario's na het Franse en Nederlandse 'nee' (en)

European Constitution: If at first you don't succeed

Written by Andrew Duff MEP and published in FT.com on Thu 15th Sep 2005

Political forces reassembling in Brussels after the summer are beginning to reveal the current state of their various reflections on the European Union's constitutional crisis.

 

In June, the European Council imposed a 'period of reflection' - without stated purpose - in order to cover up its own embarrassment at the rejection of its Constitution by the voters of two of the founding member states and the refusal by the UK to proceed with its already half-hearted attempt at ratification.

 

As the current president-in-office of the EU Council, the British government might have been expected to give a lead. Alas, there is no evidence of any British reflection whatsoever about the future of Europe. The European Commission promises an autumn white paper on 'communicating Europe', but this will avoid taking political choices. So it falls to the European Parliament to fill some political space.

Six scenarios

MEPs face as many as six possible courses of action of varying degrees of legality, desirability or probability.These are:-

  

(1) Abandonment

Abandon the Constitution and try to make do with the Treaty of Nice - effectively saying farewell to further enlargement, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and all the promise of the Constitution in terms of improved democracy, capacity and efficacy. This would be seen, at home and abroad, as an admission of failure by this generation of Europe's leaders.

If the Constitution were abandoned, it would be tempting for a group of member states to attempt to deploy existing provisions on enhanced cooperation in some specific policy areas. However, following the rejection of the Constitution by France and the Netherlands, the composition of such a core group (of at least eight states) is difficult to envisage. Under the Nice rules, the scope of enhanced cooperation is limited and its value in procedural terms is questionable. It would endanger the Union's cohesion and challenge the principle of loyal cooperation. There would be complication not simplification.

 

(2) Second try

Oblige France, the Netherlands and the UK to have another go at ratifying the existing text once Chirac, Balkenende and Blair have retired - presumably not before 2007. Additional protocols could be drafted with the aim of mollifying public opinion, as was done to reverse previous referendum Noes in Denmark and Ireland. This approach may be desirable but in the foreseeable political circumstances hardly possible.

 

(3) Avoid treaty change

Select a small number of institutional reforms envisaged in the Constitution and try to implement them not by treaty amendment but by changes in rules of procedure, by inter-institutional agreements, or by cooking up new arrangements outside the EU structure altogether.

Even if this approach could be agreed in general, it is unlikely that member states could agree on the specifics.Although one or two ad hoc improvements could be made to the conduct of EU affairs at national level, the governance of the EU itself would be left almost untouched.'Cherry-picking' would be wide open to challenge in the Court of Justice.This scenario lacks transparency and would put into reverse the drive for simplification.

 

(4) Lower the threshold

 

Convene a new intergovernmental conference (IGC) with the sole purpose of modifying Article 48 of the existing Treaty on European Union so that the Constitution could be brought into force when ratified by fewer than all member states.Formal provision would also need to be made for second-class or associate membership of the Union.

A similar proposal was vigorously opposed by most governments and many national parliaments in the Convention.Even if agreed by an IGC, such a profound change to the existing constitutional order would have to survive the test of numerous referendums.Effectively, this is the scenario of last resort.

 

(5) Revise the Treaty of Nice

 

Adopt a piecemeal approach to treaty reform, keeping intact as many institutional provisions of the Constitution as possible but ditching the constitutional mantle.The Treaty of Nice would be amended but not replaced.

The precedents are not encouraging. Agreement on priorities for reform would be problematic. A new package promises to be quite complex. If it is to address the Union's key institutional problems, a revised Treaty of Nice would need to include reforms with respect to both the formula and scope of QMV, along with codecision; the size and shape of the Commission and Parliament; the setting up of the Foreign Minister and the external action service; integration of the three pillar system; and the status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

In sacrificing the Constitution's package deal, the Union would also be dismantling the impressive consensus that had been built up around it.Experience suggests that it can be more difficult to get basic agreement in the EU when tinkering with institutions than when taking bold steps.

Ad hoc treaty revision according to no long-term strategy smacks of pre-Laeken days. It would not settle the constitutional future of the Union but, on the contrary, threaten further bouts of instability. It would be bound to aggravate relations between the European Council and European Parliament.

Deprived of the promise of a comprehensive constitutional settlement and of better policy making across a wider spectrum, public opinion would be justifiably suspicious.

The political consequences of such a tactical retrenchment might be severe, especially in those countries where in any case referendums will have to be held to bring any revised EU treaty into force, as well as in those - indeed, a majority of member states - which have already ratified successfully the original Constitution.

(6) Renegotiate the Constitution

Renegotiate the Constitution to make it better and more appealing to public opinion. Use the period of reflection to prepare for a new Convention and IGC to make some judicious improvements to the existing text.

Timeframe

As the European Parliament considers these alternative scenarios, as well the processes to achieve them, special attention will be paid to the stance of the French socialist party, which was in the eye of the storm of last May's referendum.

The PSF hopes to establish its policy at its congress in Le Mans on 18-20 November. In an influential paper, Pierre Moscovici, former Europe Minister, draws three main conclusions from the No vote: France rejects an EU that is too liberal, too technocratic, too ineffective and endlessly expanding but at the same time wants a bold and self-assured reorientation of the Union rather than its destruction.

His prescriptions include centralised governance of the eurozone, more investment in R&D, a common EU cultural policy and an EU fund to help employees affected by outsourcing. As far as the institutions are concerned, Moscovici, who was a member of the European Convention, accepts the package deal of the Constitution, but wants the Commission to be elected more directly by and from the European Parliament. The French left looks set to support a new Convention with a fresh mandate to produce an improved Constitution, using the defeated version as a good first draft.

  

Andrew Duff is the Parliament's co-rapporteur on the period of reflection on the future of Europe.

Bron: Website Andrew Duff