[autom.vertaling] De Commissie ontruimt Zweedse elektriciteitsfusie (en)

The European Commission has cleared the acquisition by the Swedish electricity company Sydkraft of its rival Graninge, both of whom are active primarily in Sweden and Finland. The Commission was concerned that the merger would impede competition in Sweden where the three largest players, including Sydkraft, account for about 80% of the electricity markets. However, the Commission's investigation demonstrated that the merger would have no or very limited effect on the competitive structure of the Swedish and other Nordic markets.

On 29 September 2003, the Commission received a notification of a transaction by which Sydkraft AB, the second largest electricity company in Sweden, would acquire sole control of Graninge AB, the number five producer in Sweden. Sydkraft belongs to the German E.ON Group.

Both Sydkraft and Graninge are active in the generation, transmission, distribution and sale of electricity. In Sweden, the three largest electricity companies have a combined market share of more than 80%. Graninge has a market share of only 2%.

Since the mid-nineties the Nordic electricity sector has gradually been liberalised and today, although some bottlenecks may occur under certain peak-load conditions, the Swedish market is generally closely linked to all or parts of the other Nordic countries, through, amongst other means, the Nordic power exchange Nord Pool. Producers and traders have access to the whole electricity network and end-users are in principle free to choose their supplier.

The Commission investigated the effect of the merger from the stage of generation to final consumption. Although the oligopolistic market structure presents some challenges for the maintenance of effective competition, the removal of Graninge as an independent player on either level does not alter the competition landscape significantly, neither in Sweden nor in the Nordic countries as a whole. The new entity will neither be in a position in which it would be able to act unilaterally or together with others to the detriment of competition. The main reasons for this are related to Graninge's limited production capacity. The new entity would also remain less than half the size of the largest player in Sweden, Vattenfall.

In the Nordic countries taken as a whole, the market share of the merged entity is below 10% and will not give rise to competition concerns.

Sydkraft and Graninge are also active in the supply of district heating and natural gas, but their combined market shares are small and the merger does not create competition concerns on these markets.