Analyse Clingendael: Europa's onzekere toekomst (en)
Erik Jones is Professor and Director of European Studies at the John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and Director at the Bologna Institute for Policy Research. In addition to his academic work, he serves as Head of Europe for Oxford Analytica.
DEN HAAG - A self-appointed "Future of Europe Group" of 11 EU foreign ministers published a report in September 2012, calling for a stronger EU role in foreign and security policy. Erik Jones thinks the vision presented in the report does not offer any viable solutions to the weakness of the High Representative. Europe should focus on solving the internal crisis before increasing EU´s role in the world.
When historians look back on the major turning points in Europe's sovereign debt crisis, European Central Bank (ECB) President Mario Draghi's pledge on 26 July 2012 to do whatever it takes to safeguard the euro will be at or close to the top of the list. Draghi embraced the responsibility of his office and acted decisively to fulfil his obligations. He may ultimately fail to end the crisis; but he proved to be the most important actor at the moment.
It is hard to imagine the European Union's High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy ever finding themselves in such a position. Javier Solana did not have the opportunity when Russia traded blows with Georgia in August 2008 (before the Lisbon Treaty was implemented) and neither did Lady Catherine Ashton when she confronted the crisis in Haiti soon after taking office. These were both moments of prominence for the High Representative, but not moments of decisive
intervention.
The events that have unfolded in North Africa and the Middle East over the eighteen months from the start of the Arab Spring through the violence in Syria have not given much space for decisiveness on the part of the High Representative either. Lady Ashton has been engaged in much quiet diplomacy in the region - not to mention wrestling with a host of other activities related to the institutionalization of her new office back in Brussels - but no historian is likely to look back on her record to argue that her actions set the course of events as they unfolded.
The 'Final Report of the Future of Europe Group' has nothing to add to the decisiveness of the High Representative and offers little to bolster the role of the ECB President (or other EU economic policymakers) either. In that sense, the document does little to prepare the European Union to respond to future crisis. Instead, it focuses on rules, institutions, and procedures to keep crisis at bay. Moreover, there is a good reason for this bias. The requirements for democratic accountability over decisive foreign policy actions are high. Even heads of state or government struggle to defend the legitimacy of their choices in times of crisis. German chancellor had difficulty explaining her government's decision to abstain from supporting UN Security Council resolution 1973; Barack Obama had difficulty explain his administration's decision to support the Libyan intervention.
The problem of democratic accountability arises in any context of decisive executive intervention - including Draghi's pledge to do whatever is necessary to safeguard the euro. Even if the ECB President is acting within the letter of his mandate, it is worth considering - as the German Constitutional Court has done and will continue doing - whether the ECB's actions fall within the member state legislators' intent when they ratified the European Treaties and supporting documents. The central question is not just whether Europe level action falls within the organisation's delegated competence but also whether it was legitimate to delegate that kind of authority so far from the reach of the voters in the first place.
Even if the democratic justification for focusing on institutions, rules, and procedures is sound, the absence of discretionary authority weakens the office of the High Representative by depriving the European Union and its Common Foreign and Security Policy of a crucial element of 'actorness'. Moreover, that weakness cannot be repaired by strengthening the High Representative's coordinating role or representative responsibility. Closer cooperation with the heads of state and government together with more frequent international meetings with the national parliaments will not improve matters either.
The Future of Europe Group offers a vision of Europe that cannot play a decisive role in ending a crisis. Their Europe may work better internally and it should offer a superior platform for managing interdependence. But those characteristics may not make the difference between the success and failure of Europe if we face another crisis like the one we are in at the moment. Indeed, it might be better to hold off any discussion of further reforming Europe's institutions until we are sure the current crisis is coming to an end.