Concurrentie: Commissie tegen kartelvorming- Vraag en antwoord (en)

Met dank overgenomen van Europese Commissie (EC) i, gepubliceerd op dinsdag 20 november 2007.

What is a cartel?

It is an illegal secret agreement concluded between competitors to fix prices, restrict supply and/or divide up markets. The agreement may take a wide variety of forms but often relates to sales prices or increases in such prices, restrictions on sales or production capacities, sharing out of product or geographic markets or customers, and collusion on the other commercial conditions for the sale of products or services.

Why are cartels harmful to consumers, businesses and to the economy in general?

Cartels shield participants from competition allowing them to charge higher prices and removing the pressure on them to improve the products they sell or find more efficient ways in which to produce them. It is the customers (companies and consumers) who foot the bill in terms of paying higher prices for lower quality and narrower choice. This not only makes consumers and businesses suffer but also adversely affects the competitiveness of the economy as a whole.

What legal basis underpins the Commission's action to combat cartels?

Article 81 of the Treaty establishing the European Community prohibits agreements and concerted practices between firms that distort competition within the Single Market. Fines of up to 10% of their worldwide turnover may be imposed on the guilty parties.

What happens to the proceeds from fines?

The amount of the fines is paid into the Community budget. The fines therefore help to finance the European Union and reduce the tax burden on individuals.

Does the Commission have the last word?

All cartel decisions by the Commission may be appealed against before the Court of First Instance (CFI) and then before the Court of Justice of the European Communities in Luxembourg. They can, therefore, be closely scrutinised by these two courts, which are empowered to annul decisions in whole or in part and to reduce or increase fines, where this is deemed appropriate.

What is the European Commission's leniency programme?

It encourages firms to provide the Commission with insider information on cartels. The first firm to do so is granted total immunity from fines. Other firms that follow suit may be granted a reduction in the amount of the fine. This policy is very effective in uncovering cartels but does not prevent the Commission from conducting investigations on its own initiative. For further information, see IP/06/1705 , MEMO/06/469 and MEMO/06/470 . Companies wishing to approach the Commission in order to benefit from the Commission notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases should consult:

http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/cartels/leniency/leniency.cfm

What practical steps has the Commission taken to step up action against cartels?

Since June 2005 an entire Directorate composed of five units (Directorate G, with a staff of around 70) in the Competition Directorate General has been involved exclusively in helping the Commission to detect and punish cartels.

What action is open to consumers and companies who feel that they have been victims of such illegal agreements?

Any firm or individual adversely affected by practices censured by the Commission, such as those set out in today's decision, may bring the matter before a court in a Member State of the European Union with a view to seeking compensation for damage suffered as a result of such practices. Fines imposed by the Commission are different from the damages awarded by national courts. While action for damages before a court can also have a certain deterrent effect, its main purpose is to compensate victims of anti-competitive behaviour or to secure compensation for damage suffered. A Commission Green Paper on facilitating action for damages before courts in the Member States was published in December 2005.

What are the ten largest fines imposed by the Commission in cartel cases?

By company:

 

Firm

Fine (euros)

Year

ThyssenKrupp 1 ( IP/07/209 )

479 669 850

2007

Hoffmann-La Roche AG ( IP/01/1625 )

462 000 000

2001

Siemens AG 1 ( IP/07/80 )

396 562 500

2007

ENI SpA 1 ( IP/06/1647)

272 250 000

2006

Lafarge SA 1 ( IP/02/1744 )

249 600 000

2002

BASF AG 2 ( IP/01/1625 )

236 845 000

2001

Otis 1 ( IP/07/209 )

224 932 950

2007

Heineken NV 1 (IP/07/509 )

219 275 000

2007

Arkema 1 ( IP/06/698 )

219 131 250

2006

Solvay 1 ( IP/06/560 )

167 062 000

2006

By sector:

 

Sector

Year

Total (euros)

Elevators and escalators 1

2007

992 312 200

Vitamins 2

2001

790 505 000

Gas insulated switchgear 1

2007

750 512 500

Synthetic rubber (BR/ESBR) 1

2006

519 050 000

Plasterboard 1

2002

478 320 000

Hydrogen peroxide 1

2006

388 128 000

Acrylic glass 1

2006

344 562 500

Hard Haberdashery: Fasteners

2007

328 644 000

Copper fittings 1

2006

314 760 000

Industrial bags 1

2004

290 710 000

Fines imposed on cartels by the Commission since 2003:

 

Year

Sector covered by cartel

Number of undertakings subject to decision

Total fine (euros)

2007

Professional videotape ( IP/07/1725 )

3

74 790 000

2007

Bitumen Spain ( IP/07/1438 )

5

183 651 000

2007

Hard Haberdashery: Fasteners ( IP/07/1362 )

7

328 644 000

2007

Dutch beer market ( IP/07/509 ) 1

4

273 783 000

2007

Elevators and escalators ( IP/07/209 ) 1

5

992 312 200

2007

Gas insulated switchgear ( IP/07/80 ) 1

11

750 512 500

2006

Alloy surcharge (re-adoption) ( IP/06/1851 ) 1

1

3 168 000

2006

Synthetic rubber (BR/ESBR) ( IP/06/1647 ) 1

6

519 050 000

2006

Steel beams (re-adoption) ( IP/06/1527 ) 1

1

10 000 000

2006

Copper fittings (IP/06/1222) 1

11

314 760 000

2006

Bitumen Netherlands ( IP/06/1179 ) 1

14

266 717 000

2006

Acrylic Glass ( IP/06/698 ) 1

5

344 562 500

2006

Hydrogen Peroxide ( IP/06/560 ) 1

9

388 128 000

2005

Rubber chemicals ( IP/05/1656 ) 1

4

75 860 000

2005

Industrial bags ( IP/05/1508 ) 1

16

290 710 000

2005

Italian tobacco ( IP/05/1315 ) 1

6

56 052 000

2005

Industrial thread ( IP/05/1140 ) 1

11

43 497 000

2005

Monochloroacetic acid ( IP/05/61 ) 1

4

216 910 000

2004

Choline chloride ( IP/04/1454 ) 1

6

66 340 000

2004

Haberdashery products ( IP/04/1313 ) 1

3

60 000 000

2004

Spanish tobacco ( IP/04/1256 ) 1

9

20 038 000

2004

French beer ( IP/04/1153 )

2

2 500 000

2004

Sodium gluconate ( IP/01/1355 ) 1

1

19 040 000

2004

Copper plumbing tubes ( IP/04/1065 ) 1

9

222 291 100

2003

Industrial pipes ( IP/03/1746 ) 1

3

78 730 000

2003

Organic peroxides ( IP/03/1700 ) 1

6

69 531 000

2003

Carbon and graphite products ( IP/03/1651 ) 1

6

101 440 000

2003

Sorbates ( IP/03/1330 ) 1

5

138 400 000

2003

Viandes bovines ( IP/03/479 ) 2

6

12 690 000

1 Appeal lodged before the CFI.

2 Following judgment by the CFI.